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STUDENT COMMENT
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea
GEORGE A. PIERCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The tenth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) opened in New York March 9, 1981 marked
by the eleventh-hour firing of the United States UNCLOS delegation,'
and in the shadow of the Reagan Administration's recent decision to pre-
vent the conclusion of negotiations at what had been hoped would be the
final session.2 The document in question is the Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Informal Text (the Draft Convention), which has been
more than seven years in the making.3 The Draft Convention contains
some 320 primary articles and seven annexes. It is a highly complex and
comprehensive codification of both new and customary principles of in-
ternational law" covering a range of activities as vast as the area of the
world's surface with which it deals."
Given its complexity and comprehensiveness, it is axiomatic that dis-
putes as to the scope, construction, and efficacy of the Draft Convention
will arise. Without appropriate methods of dealing with these disputes, it
will become a lifeless document of greatly diminished significance. The
purpose of this comment is to suggest a method of analysis of the dispute
settlement provisions in the Draft Convention. In light of the recently
revived potential for modification of the Draft Convention, the comment
George A. Pierce is a J.D. candidate at the University of Denver College of Law. B.A.,
1972, University of Colorado; A.M., 1975, University of Northern Colorado.
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
2. Id., Mar. 10, 1981, at 4, col. 3.
:. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/
WP.10/Rev.3/Add.1 [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention]. For a history of previous con-
ferences on the law of the sea, see Sohn, Problems of Dispute Settlement, in LAW OF THE
SEA: CONFERENCE OUTCOMES AND PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 223 (E. Miles & J. Gamble
eds. 1977).
4. See, e.g., Hazou, Determining the Extent of Admissibility of Reservations: Some
Considerations with Regard to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 69 (1980).
5. For a survey of the many potential uses of the oceans, see Nanda, Some Legal Ques-
tions on the Peaceful Uses of Ocean Space, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 343 (1969).
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will also offer an alternative which hopefully will facilitate dispute settle-
ment without destroying the delicate balance of compromise which has
been so tediously hammered out over the course of the UNCLOS
negotiations.
The comment will begin with a description of the basic structure of
the dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention. The efficacy of
these procedures will then be considered in the context of varying degrees
of national sovereignty, ranging from unqualified or absolute sovereign
rights to disputes arising in areas over which national sovereignty is spe-
cifically precluded. The present form of dispute settlement has grown
through compromise and from the fears of what the Group of 77 perceives
as the legal chicanery of the developed world. The result is that dispute
settlement is being allocated largely to (1) the national forums, where the
dispute arises concerning an area over which there is national sovereignty,
and (2) the international political forum, regarding disputes in areas over
which national sovereignty is impossible. Although this comment is criti-
cal of the dispute settlement scheme as it presently exists, the structure
appears to be necessary if a workable agreement is ever to be reached.
Therefore, a recommendation is made which would leave the delicate bal-
ance of compromise upon which the Draft Convention is based intact,
while facilitating settlement in what appears to be the least threatening
forum to the Group of 77: the international political arena.
II. BASIC STRUCTURE OF DRAFT CONVENTION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The Draft Convention imposes a basic obligation on member states
to settle disputes by peaceful means,' but allows considerable freedom of
choice as to the forum or method to be employed.7 The Draft Convention
provides for the following alternatives for the settlement of disputes: the
Law of the Sea Tribunal (LOST);8 the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber
(SBDC) of the Law of the Sea Tribunal; 9 the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ);' 0 an arbitral tribunal;"1 a special arbitral tribunal;"' concilia-
tion;13 or any other procedure to which the parties have agreed." Member
6. Article 279 of the Draft Convention states: "The States Parties shall settle any dis-
pute between them relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention in accor-
dance with paragraph 3 of Article 2, and shall seek a solution through the peaceful means
indicated in paragraph 1 of Article 33, of the Charter of the United Nations." Draft Conven-
tion, supra note 3, art. 279.
7. Article 280 sets forth: "Nothing in this Part shall impair the right of any States
Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them relating to the interpretation
or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice." Id. art. 280.
8. Id. art. 287(1)(a).
9. Id. art. 186.
10. Id. art. 287(1)(b).
11. Id. art. 287(1)(c).
12. Id. art. 287(1)(d).
13. Id. art. 284.
14. Id. art. 280. For a survey of potential means of dispute settlement, see Haubert,
Toward Peaceful Settlement of Ocean Space Disputes: A Working Paper, 11 SAN DIEGo L.
REv. 733, 740-46 (1974).
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states may agree to submit to dispute settlement before the LOST, the
ICJ, an arbitral tribunal, or a special arbitral tribunal either at the time
of signing, or at anytime thereafter.1 5 Therefore, maximum flexibility is
allowed as to the forum and method of dispute settlement.' 6
Two systems of dispute settlement are included in the Draft Conven-
tion. These systems are generally referred to as the general system and
the functional system." Prior to bringing a dispute before either a func-
tional or general forum, however, or where a settlement procedure has
terminated without a settlement of the dispute, member states are re-
quired to "exchange views regarding settlement of the dispute through
negotiations in good faith or other peaceful means." 5 Member states also
have the option of seeking settlement through conciliation, 9 or other pro-
cedures under general, regional, or special agreements."' Where these al-
ternatives have failed to bring about a resolution of the dispute involving
member states, settlement is referred to the appropriate functional or
general forum.
A. The Functional System
The functional system is designed to allow the parties to a specific
type of dispute access to a forum which is specialized in that field.21 The
functional system is contained in two places, annex VIII on special arbi-
tration procedure, and section 6 of part XI on the SBDC.
Article 1 of annex VIII provides that
any party to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
the articles of this Convention relating to (1) fisheries, (2) protection
and preservation of the marine environment, (3) marine scientific re-
search, and (4) navigation, including pollution from vessels, may sub-
mit the dispute to the special arbitration procedure provided for in
this annex by notification addressed to the other party or parties to
the dispute.
22
Annex VIII also provides for separate lists of experts in each of the above
four special areas. 28 Special arbitral tribunals are then formed as needed
by selecting members from the appropriate list in accordance with the
15. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 287(1).
16. See Mirvahabi, Fishery Disputes Settlement and the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, 57 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, DE SCIENCES
DIPLOMATIQUES ET PoLrrIQUEs 45, 50 (1979).
17. Id.
18. Draft Convention, supra note 3, arts. 281, 286.
19. Id. art. 284.
20. Id. art. 282.
21. For a discussion of the general and functional systems approach, see Adede, Settle-
ment of Disputes Arising Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 69 AM. J. INT'L L.' 798, 799
(1975); Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of the Law'of the Sea Convention, 12 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 495, 506-07 (1975).
22. Draft Convention, supra note 3, annex VIII, art. 1.
23. Id. annex VIII, art. 2.
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procedure set out in article 3.4 In this way, the treaty allows parties to a
dispute of an appropriate nature to submit to settlement by a specialized
arbitral tribunal, the members of which are experts in the field of the
dispute.
The SBDC is a functional tribunal established for resolution of cer-
tain disputes arising within or relating to the area.2" Basically, the SBDC
has jurisdiction over disputes between: (1) member states concerning the
interpretation or application of part XI;2 e (2) a member state and the
authority concerning acts or omissions of either which are allegedly in
violation of part XI or acts of the authority "alleged to be in excess of
jurisdiction or a misuse of power";2 (3) parties to a contract, including
member states, the authority, or enterprise, state entities and natural or
juridical persons concerning interpretation of the contract and acts or
omissions of any party thereto;"' (4) the authority and a prospective con-
tractor who has been sponsored by a state;" and (5) the authority and a
state party, a state entity, or a natural or juridical person sponsored by a
state party where the authority is alleged to have incurred liability for
"wrongful damages arising out of the exercise of the powers and functions
of the Authority."' s The SBDC is composed of eleven members of the
LOST who are selected by a majority vote of the LOST.31
Provision is also made for an ad hoc chamber of the SBDC to deal
with particular disputes which may be submitted thereto upon the re-
quest of any party to the dispute."2 Ad hoc chambers are composed of
three members of the SBDC who are selected in accordance with article
37 of annex VI.38
24. Id. annex VIII, art. 3. Subparagraph (a) contains the basic provision:
[Tihe special arbitral tribunal shall consist of five members. Each party to the
dispute shall appoint two members, one of whom may be its national, to be
chosen preferably from the appropriate list or lists relating to the matters in
dispute. The parties to the dispute shall by agreement appoint the President of
the special arbitral tribunal who shall be chosen preferably from the appropri-
ate list and shall be a national of a third State, unless the parties otherwise
agree.
25. Id. art. 288(3).
26. Id. art. 187(a).
27. Id. art. 187(b).
28. Id. art. 187(c).
29. Id. art. 187(d).
30. Id. art. 187(e).
31. Id. annex VI, art. 4(5). For a critique of the procedures for election of members to
the LOST and the SBDC from the perspective of developed nations, see Bernhardt, Com-
pulsory Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Negotiations: A Reassessment, 19 VA. J.
INT'L L. 69, 71-73 (1978).
32. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 188(1)(b).
33. Id. annex VI, art. 37. The basic provision is contained in paragraph 1, which
provides:
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall form an ad hoc chamber, composed of
three of its members, for dealing with a particular dispute submitted to it in
accordance with article 188, paragraph 1(b), of Part XI of this Convention. The
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As an alternative to settlement by the SBDC, disputes between
states parties regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty
may be submitted to a Special Chamber of the LOST upon the request of
the disputing parties.s 4 Special Chambers are composed of three or more
members selected from among the members of the LOST. Special Cham-
bers are used for dealing with particular categories of disputes and for
determination of which disputes may be resolved by summary
procedure.8 5
Binding commercial arbitration provides another alternative to dis-
pute settlement before the SBDC. Disputes involving the interpretation
or application of a contract or plan of work may be submitted to binding
commercial arbitration at the request of any party to the dispute.8 6 The
commercial arbitral tribunal, however, has no jurisdiction to determine
any question of interpretation of the convention. 7 Questions as to the
interpretation of part XI must be submitted to the SBDC for a ruling.8
B. The General System
In contrast to the functional system of dispute settlement, the gen-
eral system allows for the settlement of any dispute arising out of the
Draft Convention to be settled in the general forum of the parties'
choice. 9 General forums include the LOST, the ICJ, and an arbitral tri-
bunal constituted in accordance with annex VII.
The LOST is composed of twenty-one members,"' no two of whom
may be from the same state."' Each member state is allowed to submit
two nominations for election to the LOST. Two-thirds of the member
states are required to establish a quorum for LOST member elections,
and "the persons elected to the Tribunal shall be those nominees who
obtain the largest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of votes of
the states parties present and voting, provided that such majority shall
composition of such a chamber shall be determined by the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber with the approval of the parties.
34. Id. art. 188(1)(a).
35. Id. annex VI, art. 15.
36. Id. art. 188(2)(a). This article provides:
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a contract re-
ferred to in article 187, subparagraph c(1), shall be submitted, at the request of
any party to the dispute, to binding commercial arbitration, unless at any time
the parties to the dispute otherwise agree or have agreed. A commercial arbi-
tral tribunal, to which such dispute is submitted, shall have no jurisdiction to
determine any question of interpretation of the Convention. When such a dis-
pute also involves a question of the interpretation of Part XI and the relevant
annexes, with respect to activities in the Area, such question shall be referred
to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber for a ruling.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Mirvahabi, supra note 16, at 50.
40. Draft Convention, supra note 3, annex VI, art. 2.
41. Id. annex VI, art. 3.
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include at least a majority of the States parties."'4 2
Arbitral tribunals are composed of five members from a list of arbi-
trators which is compiled and maintained by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations."' Each member state is entitled to nominate four arbitra-
tors to the list." Arbitrators are then selected for each panel in accor-
dance with the procedures in article 3 of annex VII."'
III. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND DisPuTE SETTLEMENT
It is apparent that a major portion of the dispute settlement proce-
dures of the Draft Convention involve potential conflicts of national in-
terest. Therefore, it is essential to any analysis of the dispute settlement
provisions of the Draft Convention to consider changes of national inter-
ests brought about by UNCLOS.
One of the dominant characteristics of the Draft Convention is a tre-
mendous increase in the area of ocean space which is made subject to
some form of sovereign national jurisdiction.4 This expansion of national
jurisdiction comes about primarily through an increase in the breadth of
the territorial sea,'" the creation of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),"
and recognition of the rights of coastal states to the resources of their
continental shelves.4" National jurisdiction over these areas takes the
form of varying degrees of sovereign rights, where the term "sovereign
rights" has different meanings in different contexts.5 0 For the purposes of
this paper, the dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention will
be analyzed in the context of three possible degrees of sovereign rights:
(1) unqualified national sovereignty;
42. Id. annex VI, art. 4.
43. Id. annex VII, articles 2 and 3(a).
44. Id. annex VII, art. 2.
45. Id. annex VII, art. 3. Subparagraph (a) sets forth the basic provision:
[T]he arbitral tribunal shall consist of five members. Each party to the dispute
shall appoint one member, who shall be chosen preferably from the list and
may be its national. In the case of the party requesting arbitration, such ap-
pointment shall be made at the time of the request. The other three members
shall be appointed by agreement of the parties and shall be chosen preferably
from the list and shall be nationals of third States, unless the parties otherwise
agree. The parties to the dispute shall appoint the President of the arbitral
tribunal from among these three members.
46. The continental shelf and slope of the United States alone covers an area of 1.2
million square miles. See Hearings on S.7 and S.544 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 961
(1969).
47. Draft Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3. This article sets forth that: "Every State
has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this convention."
48. Id. art. 57. This article sets forth that: "The exclusive economic zone shall not ex-
tend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured."
49. Id. arts. 76 and 77.
50. See Rosenne, Settlement of Fisheries Disputes in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 73
AM. J. INT'L L. 89, 97 (1979).
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(2) national sovereignty qualified by or subject to international rights;
and
(3) non-sovereignty.
From these three levels of national sovereignty, four possible dispute
situations arise:
(1) disputes regarding an exercise of unqualified national sovereignty;
(2) disputes regarding a qualification or limitation of national
sovereignty;
(3) disputes arising within, or regarding an area of non-sovereignty;
and
(4) disputes regarding the delimitation of boundaries between areas
subject to some form of national sovereignty."
A. Unqualified National Sovereignty
Dispute settlement provisions relating to an exercise of unqualified
sovereign jurisdiction are the least effective of those contained in the
treaty. An illustration of this may be found by examination of the sover-
eign rights of the coastal state over the EEZ. Within the EEZ, the coastal
state has
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserv-
ing and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living,
of the sea-bed and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of
energy from the water currents and winds.62
Article 56(2) requires the coastal state to have "due regard for the
rights and duties of other States" when exercising its own rights within
the EEZ53 Although the "due regard" standard of article 56(2) appears to
be a qualification upon the unrestrained exercise of sovereign rights to
economic exploitation of the EEZ by the coastal states, it clearly is not in
the areas of scientific research and fishing rights.
1. Fishing Rights in the EEZ
Article 61(1) provides that "the coastal State shall determine the al-
lowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone.""
Article 62(2) continues that the coastal state "shall determine its capacity
to harvest the living resources" of the EEZ, and where the coastal state
does not "have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall
. . . give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch."56 In
the event of an excess allowable catch, reference is specifically made to
land-locked states, states with special geographical characteristics," and
51. Dispute settlement regarding the delimitation of boundaries goes beyond the scope
of this paper. Relevant provisions of the Draft Convention are set forth in articles 15, 50, 59,
74, and 83.
52. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 56(1)(a).
53. Id. art. 56(2).
54. Id. art. 61(1).
55. Id. art. 62(2).
56. Id. art. 70(2). This article defines states with special geographical characteristics.
1981
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"States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone, or which have
made efforts in research and identification of stocks," as states to receive
special preference for the surplus allowable catch.57
The allowable catch, and the capacity to harvest however, are both
determined solely by the discretion of the coastal state. Under article
296(3)(a) of part XV on dispute settlement, the discretion of the coastal
state regarding these matters is not subject to third party review absent
its consent.58 The result is an unqualified sovereignty which allows the
coastal state to effectively exclude all foreign exploitation of living re-
sources within its EEZ by establishing an allowable catch which is
equivalent to its capacity to harvest."
For the purposes of this Convention, "States with special geographical charac-
teristics" mean coastal States, including States bordering enclosed or semi-en-
closed seas, whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon the ex-
ploitation of the living resources of the exclusive zones of other States in the
subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes of
their populations or parts thereof, and coastal States which can claim no exclu-
sive economic zones of their own.
57. Id. art. 62(2). This article provides that:
The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of
the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capac-
ity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other
arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions and regulations referred
to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch
having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in
relation to the developing States mentioned therein.
58. Id. art. 296(3)(a).
Unless otherwise agreed or decided by the parties concerned, disputes relating
to the interpretation or application of this Convention with regard to fisheries
shall be settled in accordance with this section, except that the coastal State
shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute
relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the exclu-
sive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for de-
termining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of sur-
pluses to other States and the terms and conditions established in its
convention and management regulations.
59. Article 296(3)(b) of the Draft Convention provides for mandatory submission of dis-
putes to conciliation upon any of the following three allegations:
(i) a coastal State has manifestly failed to comply with its obligations to ensure
through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance
of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not seriously
endangered;
(ii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, upon the request of
another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest the living re-
sources with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in fishing;
(iii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State, under the
provisions of articles 62, 69, and 70 and under the terms and conditions estab-
lished by the coastal State consistent with this Convention, the whole or part
of the surplus it has declared to exist.
However, article 296(3)(c) states that: "In any case the conciliation commission shall
not substitute its discretion for that of the coastal State." Further, even if the conciliation
commission were to make findings, article 7(2) of Annex V on Conciliation provides that:
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2. Scientific Research
An analogous' situation exists with respect to scientific research con-
ducted within the EEZ. Article 238 provides that "all States, irrespective
of their geographical location, and competent international organizations
have the right to conduct marine scientific research subject to the rights
and duties of other States as provided for in this convention." 60 Signifi-
cant limitations, however, to this basic right are found in article 245
which gives coastal states "the exclusive right to regulate and conduct
marine scientific research in their territorial sea,"" and in article 246(1),
which allows coastal states to "regulate, authorize and conduct marine
scientific research in their exclusive economic zone and on their continen-
tal shelf."'
Article 246(2) requires the consent of the coastal state to engage in
the conduct of marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the continen-
tal shelf.63 However, article 246(5) allows the coastal state to withhold its
consent as a matter of discretion.04 As is the case with fisheries, article
296(2)(a) exempts from third party dispute settlement "the exercise by
the coastal State of a right or discretion in accordance with article 246,""
and additionally "a decision by the coastal State to order suspension or
cessation of a research project in accordance with article 253."1" The re-
sult again is unqualified sovereignty, which is not subject to third party
review. 6
7
"The report of the Commission, including any conclusions or recommendations, shall not be
binding upon the parties." Therefore, there is no effective third party review of the unquali-
fied sovereignty of a coastal state over the fisheries within its EEZ.
60. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 238.
61. Id. art. 245.
62. Id. art. 246(1).
63. Id. art. 246(2).
64. Id. art. 246(5). This article provides that:
Coastal States may however in their discretion withhold their consent to
the conduct of a marine scientific research project of another State or compe-
tent international organization in the exclusive economic zone or on the conti-
nental shelf of the coastal State if the project:
(a) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural re-
sources, whether living or non-living;
(b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the in-
troduction of harmful substances into the marine environment;
(c) involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, installations
and structures referred to in articles 60 and 80;
(d) contains information communicated pursuant to article 248 regarding the
nature and objectives of the project which is inaccurate or if the researching
State or competent international organization has outstanding obligations to
the coastal State from a prior research project.
65. Id. art. 296(2)(a).
66. Id. Article 253 additionally provides that the coastal state may require suspension
of any scientific research projects in progress in the EEZ, or on the continental shelf.
67. Article 296(2)(b) provides for submission of disputes concerning scientific research
to conciliation. However, as is the case with fisheries (see note 59 supra), certain discretion-
ary acts of the coastal state are beyond review even by a conciliation commission, and in any
1981
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3. Conclusion and Alternatives
In areas of unqualified national sovereignty, recourse to third party
dispute settlement appears to be possible only upon the consent of the
sovereign. The disputing party, therefore, may be forced to seek settle-
ment by some other means. Possible alternatives to third party settle-
ment include:
(1) recourse to the national courts of the sovereign;
(2) diplomatic settlement of disputes; or
(3) settlement by private agreement with the sovereign.
An increase in the jurisdiction of the national courts of most coastal
states would probably follow from the expanded sovereignty of the
coastal states over their adjacent ocean space. Therefore, resort to a na-
tional forum may provide an alternative means of dispute settlement
where the sovereign has refused- third party dispute settlement. Difficul-
ties which may be encountered by the plaintiff in exercising this alterna-
tive, such as standing and partiality, go beyond the scope of this com-
ment. Recourse to a national forum is raised only as a possible alternative
which may be useful in certain cases."8
A more likely means of dispute settlement where an exercise of na-
tional sovereignty is excluded from third party review appears to be reso-
lution through diplomatic means such as direct negotiations between dis-
puting member states, or the use of good offices. Good offices con-
templates the involvement of a third party who serves as a facilitator to
negotiations but does not interfere with the negotiations or impose a set-
tlement upon the parties."9 Resolution by diplomacy is encouraged in the
Draft Convention, and is generally a prerequisite to settlement before a
third party forum.
70
Private agreements between foreign private industry, and the govern-
ment or private industries of the coastal state may provide one of the
event, the commission's decision is not binding upon the parties. Thus, unqualified sover-
eign rights over scientific research within the EEZ are also beyond effective third party
dispute settlement.
68. Many of the nations which took part in the third UNCLOS expressed the view that
disputes arising within an area of national sovereignty should only be amenable to settle-
ment in the national courts of the sovereign. See notes 131 and 132 infra.
69. See Haubert, supra note 14, at 741. See generally Darwin, Mediation and Good
Offices, in INTERNATIONAL DisPmTEs: THm LEGAL ASPECTS 83 (1972).
70. Draft Convention, note 3 supra. Article 281(1) provides: "If a dispute arises be-
tween States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the
parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously to exchange views regarding settlement of
the dispute through negotiations in good faith or other peaceful means." Article 286, refer-
ring to section 1 (which contains article 282), states:
Subject to the provisions of articles 296 and 298, any dispute relating to the
interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has
been reached by recourse to the provisions of section 1, be submitted, at the
request of any party to the dispute, to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction
under the provisions of this section.
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more practical means of dispute settlement, particularly in disputes in-
volving scientific research, or fishing privileges. As is the case with resort
to a national forum, the subtleties and difficulties of making private
agreements in light of the various regulations imposed by the coastal
states go beyond the scope of this paper. They are raised as possibilities
that may be useful in certain situations. 1
B. Qualified National Sovereignty
1. Some Qualifications and Problems
Paragraph 1 of article 296 sets out several areas of qualified sover-
eignty with respect to the EEZ. These qualifications are the "freedoms
and rights of navigation or overflight or the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in
article 58,"' 7" and specified international rules for the protection and pres-
ervation of the marine environment.""
Disputes relating to these qualified sovereign rights are submitted to
the dispute settlement procedures of the Draft Convention without limi-
tation or exception made for coastal state discretion. Therefore, in con-
trast to unqualified sovereign rights, the third party dispute settlement
forum is free to examine the conduct and policies of parties to a dispute
concerning qualified sovereignty in total.
This apparently expansive jurisdiction over disputes relating to qual-
ified sovereign rights does not, however, insure access to third party dis-
pute settlement procedure. One major impediment to third party review
is article 298. Paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of article 298 allow, respectively,
exceptions to settlement procedures for disputes concerning military ac-
tivities, and disputes in respect of which the United Nations Security
71. For a discussion of the use of private, or "non-governmental" agreements in the
settlement of fisheries disputes, see Mirvahabi, note 16 supra. For a discussion of United
States legislation regulating private agreements between United States and foreign fishing
concerns, see Christie, Regulation of International Joint Ventures in the Fishery Conserva-
tion Zone, 10 GA. J. INT'L L. 85 (1980).
72. The Draft Convention, supra note 3, article 58(1), states:
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, en-
joy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms re-
ferred to in article 87 of the navigation and overflight and of the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea
related to these freedoms such as those associated with the operation of ships,
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other
provisions of this Convention.
At this point, a logical contradiction in the structure of the Draft Convention should be
noted. Article 286 is "subject to the provisions of articles 296 and 298." See note 76 infra.
However, paragraph 1 of article 296 begins with the language "notwithstanding the provi-
sions of article 286." Additionally, section 2 of part XV, which includes article 296, sets
forth the compulsory dispute settlement regime of the Draft Convention. Article 296 places
limitations on the applicability of section 2, although paragraph 1 does not appear to func-
tion as a limitation itself.
73. Id. art. 296(1).
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Council is involved. 7' A recalcitrant state could thus couch its interfer-
ence with, for example, the rights of innocent passage, in terms of mili-
tary activities so as to fit within the escape provisions of article 298(1)(b).
The Draft Convention does not define what constitutes a military activ-
ity; thus, the claiming state would appear to have unfettered discretion
when arguing its actions were military activities. Therefore, even if a
member state were to submit to third party dispute settlement in general,
the escape provisions of article 298 have the potential of removing a large




A second major impediment to third party review is the lack of an
effective compulsory settlement procedure for disputes between member
states. Article 286 is the basic compulsory dispute settlement provision of
the Draft Convention. Under article 286, where diplomacy or conciliation
has failed to produce a settlement, any party to the dispute can submit
the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction.7 6 Jurisdiction over
member states, however, appears to be based upon the consent of parties,
with the exceptions of the SBDC7 7 and an arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with annex VII.
78
There are some serious deficiencies in the use of arbitration for com-
pulsory dispute settlement due to the potential for delay, and the lack of
74. Id. art. 298(1). This article sets forth in pertinent part:
1. Without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, a State Party
when signing, ratifying or otherwise expressing its consent to be bound by this
Convention, or at any time thereafter, may declare that it does not accept any
one or more of the procedures for the settlement of disputes specified in this
Convention with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes:
0
(b) Disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by gov-
ernment vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes
concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign
rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal
under article 296, Paragraphs 2 and 3;
(c) Disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is
exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations,
unless the Security Council decides to remove the matter from its agenda or
calls upon the parties to settle it by means provided for in this Convention.
75. See Bernhardt, supra note 31, at 95-99.
76. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 286. This article provides:
Subject to the provisions of articles 296 and 298, any dispute relating to the
interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has
been reached by recourse to the provisions of section 1, be submitted, at the
request of either party to the dispute, to the court or tribunal having jurisdic-
tion under the provisions of this section.
77. Id. art. 287(2): "Any declaration made under paragraph 1 shall not affect or be
affected by the obligation of a State Party to accept the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber of the Law of the Sea Tribunal to the extent and in the manner provided for in
section 6 of Part XI."
78. Id. art. 287(3): "A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a decla-
ration in force, shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with annex VII."
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procedure in the Draft Convention for enforcement of awards. Article 3 of
annex VII sets out the procedure for formation of an arbitral tribunal.79
Each party to the dispute is to select one arbitrator.80 The other three
arbitrators forming the tribunal are then selected by agreement of the
parties." In the event a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within thirty
days from the date of the receipt of the request for arbitration, or the
parties cannot agree upon the other arbitrators to be appointed to the
tribunal within sixty days from the date of receipt of the request for arbi-
tration, procedures are available to effect the necessary appointments."2
In a dispute where prompt resolution is a matter of necessity, a sixty-day,
or even a thirty-day delay could well result in a moot controversy.
Even assuming the controversy does not become moot during the de-
lay, there is no effective procedure for enforcement of the award. Rather
article 11 of annex 3 merely provides that the award "shall be complied
with by all the parties to the dispute."8 Although article 12 of annex VII
does contain procedure for resolution of disputes as to implementation of
the award, it does not contemplate enforcement as such.
The only compulsory forum for dispute settlement in the Draft Con-
vention is arbitration. However, the escape provisions of article 296, the
potential for delay, and the lack of enforcement procedures may render
arbitration ineffective in many situations.
2. Other Potential Problems: Land-locked States and the Territo-
rial Sea
Part X of the Draft Convention qualifies national sovereignty by pro-
viding land-locked states a right of access to the sea in the form of free-
dom of transit through the territory of transit states." Paragraph 3 of
article 125, however, provides that "Transit States, in the exercise of their
full sovereignty over their territory, shall have the right to take all neces-
sary measures to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for in this
Part for land-locked States shall in no way infringe their legitimate
interest."8 5
Article 125 appears to provide a balance between the rights of the
land-locked states, and those of the transit state whose sovereign rights
are qualified. Regrettably however, it is doubtful that the legal character
of the balance will be allowed to develop through any means other than
direct negotiations between the parties. Any attempt by a land-locked
state to resolve a dispute through the settlement procedures of the Draft
79. Id. annex VII, art. 3.
80. Id. annex VII, art. 3(a). See note 45 supra.
81. Id.
82. Id. annex VII, art. 3(c)-(d).
83. Id. annex VII, art. 11.
84. Draft Convention, supra note 3, at art. 125(1). Transit states are defined by article
124(1)(b) as "a State, with or without a sea-coast, situated between a land-locked State and
the sea through whose territory 'traffic in transit' passes."
85. Id.
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Convention would meet with the same stumbling blocks of a lack of effec-
tive compulsory jurisdiction, and application of an article 296 escape
mechanism as were discussed above. 6
Article 2 of the treaty subjects the sovereign rights of the coastal
state over the territorial sea to qualification by "this Convention and to
other rules of international law."'87 The principal qualifications to the sov-
ereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea are the right of inno-
cent passage, 8' transit passage,8' immunities of warships,"0 the right of
land-locked states to access to the oceans,91 obligations imposed upon the
coastal state regarding civil jurisdiction over foreign ships within its terri-
torial sea,' 2 and qualifications based upon principles of generally recog-
nized international law.93
Disputes which can be defined in terms of one of the above qualifica-
tions come under the general system of dispute settlement of the treaty.
Therefore, the parties to a dispute are left to their own devices to agree
upon an acceptable third party dispute settlement forum, or are relegated
to arbitration. In either case, the Draft Convention is less than fully
adequate.
C. Dispute Settlement Alternatives
Although there is a provision for "compulsory" arbitration, the Draft
Convention does not provide an effective dispute settlement system for
any dispute involving the qualification of a sovereign right. The parties
again appear to be left largely to their own means to find an acceptable
and effective forum. Therefore, as is the case with disputes relating to
sovereign rights, the parties may often be relegated to seeking resolution
in either a national forum, by diplomatic means, or through private
settlement.
IV. NON-SOVEREIGN DisPuTEs
Those portions of the ocean space which have not been relegated to
some form of national sovereignty are the high seas and the "regime of
the area."
86. For a discussion of the interests of land-locked states relative to the UNCLOS, see
Comment, UNCLOS III: Last Chance for Landlocked States?, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637
(1977); Hassan, Third Law of the Sea Conference Fishing Rights of Landlocked States, 8
LAw. AM. 686 (1976); Childs, The Interests of Land-Locked States in Law of the Seas, 9
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701 (1972).
87. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.
88. Id. art. 24. The coastal state, however, may regulate innocent passage in accordance
with article 21.
89. Id. art. 34. The coastal state may, however, as with innocent passage, regulate
transit passage in accordance with articles 41 and 42.
90. Id. art. 32.
91. Id. art. 125(1).
92. Id. arts. 28 and 292.
93. Id. art. 2(3).
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A. The High Seas
The regime of the high seas is contained in part VII of the Draft
Convention. At present no international body has been established to
deal with criminal acts committed upon the high seas; hence the treaty
defers to national jurisdiction for criminal punishment.
National jurisdiction over criminal acts includes penal jurisdiction in
matters of collision,94 jurisdiction over acts of piracy,9 over the transport
of slaves," regarding unauthorized radio broadcasts, 7 and the right of hot
pursuit." The most significant of these provisions is article 97 on penal
jurisdiction in matters of collision, which is a legislative reversal of the
Lotus case.99 However, the Draft Convention appears to do little else be-
yond a codification of customary international law regarding criminal ju-
risdiction on the high seas other than to reduce the spatial area of the
high seas.100
94. Id. art. 97.
95. Id. art. 105.
96. Id. art. 99.
97. Id. art. 109(2).
98. Id. art. 111.
99. The S.S. Lotus, [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 32. The Lotus case illuminates the
significance of article 97:
[F]ollowing the collision which occurred on August 2nd, 1926, on the high seas
between the French steamship Lotus and the Turkish steamship Boz-Kourt,
and upon the arrival of the French ship at Stamboul, and in consequence of
the loss of the Boz-Kourt having involved the death of eight Turkish nationals,
Turkey, by instituting criminal proceedings in pursuance of Turkish law
against Lieutenant Demons, officer of the watch on board the Lotus at the
time of the collision, has not acted in conflict with the principles of interna-
tional law, contrary to Article 15 of the Convention of Lausanne of July 24th,
1923, respecting conditions of residence and business and jurisdictipn.
In contrast, article 97(1) provides:
In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship
on the high seas, involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the
master or of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or discipli-
nary proceedings may be instituted against such person except before the judi-
cial or administrative authorities either of the flag State or of which such per-
son is a national.
For a discussion of the Lotus case, see C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
304-05 (1967).
100. Article 91(1) may potentially effect the present customary international law re-
garding nationality of ships. It provides that:
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships
have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must
exist a genuine link between the State and the ship. (Emphasis added.)
A genuine link requirement would significantly affect the use of "flags of convenience," how-
ever, given the weak dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention, it is doubtful
that any stringent genuine link requirement will develop.
For discussions of the flag of convenience problem, see B. BOczEK, FLAGS OF CONVE-
NIENCE (1962); Dempsey & Helling, Oil Pollution by Ocean Vessels-An Environmental
Tragedy: The Legal Regime of Flags of Convenience, IMCO Multilateral Conventions, and
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Disputes falling outside of national jurisdiction include those related
to the basic freedoms of navigation,0 1 overflight,1 0 2 laying of submarine
cables and pipelines,108 construction of artificial islands,104 fishing,"0 5 and
scientific research. 06 All states are required to exercise these freedoms
with due consideration for the interests of other states, and rights under
the UNCLOS with respect to activities in the area. 07 Disputes regarding
the exercises of these freedoms are relegated to the general dispute settle-
ment system.
B. The Area
The regime of the area is contained in part XI of the Draft Conven-
tion. Part XI comprises a major amount of the Draft Convention, and
deals with that portion of the ocean floor which is not subject to some
form of national sovereignty under provisions relating to the EEZ,' 0 ' or
continental shelf.' 09
Jurisdiction over the area is relegated to the Authority, which exer-
cises exclusive control over the administration of the area's resources." 0
This control is exercised primarily by two of the administrative organs of
the Authority, the Assembly and the Council."'
The Assembly is the supreme organ of the Authority to which all
other organs are held accountable."" The Assembly exercises the power
Coastal States, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 37 (1981); Herman, Flags of Convenience-New
Dimensions to an Old Problem, 24 McGILL L.J. 1 (1978).
101. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 87(1)(a).
102. Id. art. 87(1)(b).
103. Id. art. 87(1)(c).
104. Id. art. 87(1)(d).
105. Id. art. 87(l)(e).
106. Id. art. 87(1)(f).
107. Id. art. 87(2).
108. Id. art. 56.
109. Id. art. 77. Article 137(1) provides: "No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or
sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or
juridical person, appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or
sovereign rights, nor such appropriation shall be recognized."
110. Id. art. 137(2):
All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to aliena-
tion. The minerals derived from the Area, however, may only be alienated in
accordance with this Part and the rules and regulations thereunder.
111. Id. art. 158(1). In addition to an assembly, and a council, article 158(1) provides
for a secretariat. Article 158(2) provides for an operational organ referred to as the
Enterprise.
112. Id. art. 160(1):
The Assembly, as the sole organ of the Authority consisting of all the mem-
bers, shall be considered the supreme organ of the Authority to which the
other principal organs shall be accountable as specifically provided for in this
Convention. The Assembly shall have the power to establish general policies in
conformity with the relevant provisions of this Convention on any question or
matter within the competence of the Authority.
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to establish general policies of the Authority,' 3 and among its specific
powers elects members of the Council."'
The Council is the executive organ of the Authority, and establishes
the specific policies of the Authority."' The Council is composed of rep-
resentatives from various interest groups in a complex and balanced
scheme which is designed to insure that no one group is capable of gain-
ing control, or at least the ability to overly manipulate the Council to its
own ends." 6 The interest group structure of the Council is of tremendous
significance in light of the limited possibilities for judicial review of the
Authority's actions."
7
The SBDC is established as a functional forum with dispute settle-
ment jurisdiction over the area. All member states are obligated to accept
the jurisdiction of the SBDC."' However, jurisdiction of the SBDC re-
garding decisions of the Authority is limited to determination of whether
application of rules, regulations, or procedures made by the Authority
conflict with the obligations of the parties under the treaty or contract;
claims concerning lack of competence or misuse of power by the author-
ity; and claims for damages or any other legal remedy for failure to com-
ply with the terms of the contract or the treaty."' The SBDC is fore-
closed from review of the discretionary acts of the Authority, and "in no
case shall it substitute its discretion for that of the Authority."'' 0 The
SBDC is also foreclosed from deciding whether the rules, regulations, or
procedures adopted by the Authority are in conformity with the provi-
sions of the treaty.'2 '
The Draft Convention does not appear to contemplate judicial review
of the Authority, other thanregarding contracts by the Authority which
may be submitted to commercial arbitration,"' in any forum dther than
the SBDC.'2 s The result of these exclusions to SBDC jurisdiction thus is
a complete preclusion of judicial review in the excluded area. Therefore,
disputes regarding matters which are not within the jurisdiction of the
113. Id.
114. Id. art. 160(2).
115. Id. art. 162(1).
116. Id. Article 161(1) sets out the various interest groups which compose the Council.
For a discussion of the development of interest groups in the Council in relation to the
Group of 77, see Adede, The Group of 77, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L.J. 31, 56 (1979).
117. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 190: "The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall
have no jurisdiction with regard to the exercise by the Authority of its discretionary powers
in accordance with this Part; in no case shall it substitute its discretion for that of the
Authority." While it is unclear which acts of the Council are considered as discretionary acts
of the Authority, were the Council to be dominated by any one interest group, the potential
for unchecked abuse is obvious.
118. Id. art. 283(2).
119. Id. arts. 187 and 288(3).
120. Id. art. 190.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 188(2)(a).
123. Id. art. 288(3).
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SBDC may only be resolved in the political forums of the organs of the
Authority.
V. THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP OF 77
One of the most significant influences on the UNCLOS has been
from the group of developing and less developed countries.1 24 This group
is referred to as the Group of 77, and as of 1978 was composed of 122
countries,1 2 5 the majority of which are located in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. 2 6 The Group of 77 was founded in Algiers in October 1967 "as
an ad hoc grouping of 77 developing countries of the world which found it
useful to harmonize their negotiating positions on matters of trade and
development, particularly in relation to the sessions of the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development."' 7
It would be a mistake to attempt an analysis of the dispute settle-
ment provisions of the Draft Convention, or indeed of the UNCLOS as a
whole, from the perspective of a simple "Group of 77 versus developed
nations" dichotomy. The Group of 77 is in many respects more diverse
than coalescent, and as such is subject to internal conflict and compro-
mise. '2 Therefore, while no precise formulation of "Group of 77 policy"
can safely be made, certain generalizations are possible and may prove
useful.
The Group of 77 has exhibited two general characteristics which are
significant with respect to dispute settlement under the Draft Conven-
tion. First, a main source of Group of 77 unification is derived from what
one commentator has referred to as "western intransigence," or "the com-
mon enemy principle.' ' 2 9 Second, there is a strong commitment to the
development of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 3 0 The in-
fluence of these characteristics on the dispute settlement provisions of the
Draft Convention appear to have been manifested in three ways:
(1) a tremendous increase in the jurisdiction of national courts over
areas of the ocean subject to national sovereignty;
124. See Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emergent
Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555 (1979). See generally Ferreira, The
Role of African States in the Development of the Law of the Sea at the Third United
Nations Conference, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L.J. 89 (1979); Pohl, Latin America's Influence
and Role in the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L.J. 65 (1979).
125. [1978] Y.B. INT'L ORG. No. B0728. In comparison, as of 1978, there were 149 mem-
ber states of the United Nations.
126. See Friedman & Williams, supra note 124, at 559.
127. [19781 Y.B. INT'L ORG. No. A3383f.
128. While a comprehensive analysis of Group of 77 internal dynamics is beyond the
scope of this paper, the reader is cautioned that statements herein regarding Group of 77
positions are generalizations which are subject to the same degree of error as all generaliza-
tions regarding a complex sociological entity. For an analysis and model of Group of 77
internal dynamics, see Friedman & Williams, supra note 124, at 570-73.
129. Id. at 573-74.
130. See Juda, UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order, 7 OCEAN
DEV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1979).
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(2) the lack of a strong compulsory third party dispute settlement
procedure in areas of qualified sovereignty; and
(3) a steadfast insistence on total non-sovereignty of the area, along
with limited judicial review of the authority.
The common element of all three of these manifestations is that they
serve to optimize the control of the Group of 77 over the vast resources of
the ocean.
A. National Courts
The expansion of national sovereignty over the EEZ and continental
shelf was accompanied by the expectation of many Group of 77 nations of
a subsequent increase in the jurisdiction of their national courts to re-
solve disputes arising within these areas. 131 Consistent with the desire to
expand competence of the national courts is the view that immunity from
third party compulsory dispute settlement regarding matters within na-
tional competence is the only way in which the integrity of both the na-
tional courts, as well as that of the national sovereignty may be in-
sured.18 2 It is submitted that prohibitions on review of coastal state
discretion in the areas of fishing rights and scientific research within the
EEZ are manifestations of this Group of 77 attitude.
B. Third Party Dispute Settlement
The reluctance of the Group of 77 to submit to compulsory third
party dispute settlement is apparent in other multinational conferences
as well. As one commentator recently observed regarding the Group of 77
position on the dispute settlement provisions of a Code of Conduct for
the Transfer of Technology being negotiated by the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD):
A major difference in the techniques is found in the extent to which
the parties are willing to give up their flexibility and right to control
131. Statement by Mr. Gayan (Mauritius), 5 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 36, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.62/WP.8/WP.9/Add.1 (1976). Mr Gayan succinctly stated this position:
Disputes could be expected to arise in two areas: first, the exclusive eco-
nomic zone or the continental shelf of a State; and secondly, all areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.
Since the coastal State exercised sovereign rights over the first area, it was
natural that the national tribunals of that State should be the only forums for
the settlement of disputes arising in that area; that principle was intrinsic to
the basic notion of State sovereignty.
132. Statement by Mr. Njenga (Kenya), 5 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 34, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/
WP.8/WP.9/Add.1 (1976):
All matters relating to that zone were exclusively within the competence of the
coastal State, and to accept the possibility of compulsory third-party settle-
ment would mean that the coastal State might be subjected to constant harass-
ment by having to appear before international tribunals at considerable loss of
time and money. Similarly, where the coastal State had been given clearly de-
fined jurisdiction by the convention, particularly with respect to the preserva-
tion of the marine environment, its power would be negated if it could be sub-
jected, each time it exercised such power, to compulsory dispute settlement
systems on matters which could be dealt with through the local courts.
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the outcome of a dispute. . . . The developed countries advocate al-
most complete party autonomy as to means of dispute settlement; the
developing countries, on the other hand, take the position that only
the technology-receiving country should exercise legal jurisdiction.
These positions reflect the basic ideologies involved and illustrate the
difficulty of hypothesizing a mutually acceptable method of
settlement."
As is the case with the UNCTAD Code of Conduct, a basic difference
in the position of the Group of 77 and the developed nations has necessi-
tated compromise." The compromise taken appears to be submission of
disputes in areas where some form of national sovereignty is exercised to
compulsory arbitration rather than compulsory judicial determination.'"
Compulsory arbitration allows the disputing states parties a degree of
control over the composition of the arbitral tribunal.'* However, in the
event the parties to a dispute are unable to agree upon the composition of
an arbitral tribunal either the president of the LOST or, if the president
is a national of one of the parties to the dispute, then the next senior
member of the LOST will appoint the members. 7 The numerical superi-
ority of the Group of 77 allows these nations significant control over elec-
tion of the LOST and its president,1 3 8 therefore leading one publicist to
conclude: "Because less developed States generally control the election of
133. Christie, Techniques for Settlement of Transaction Disputes Involving Transfer
of Technology, 14 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 264, 266 (1979).
134. See Geneva Session of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference:
Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1975):
The basic problem is an ideological gap between those possessing the techno-
logical ability to develop deep seabed minerals and those developing countries
which insist that the international Authority directly and effectively control all
deep seabed mining and associated activities, and ultimately become the exclu-
sive operator on the deep seabed. The developing countries' position in this
area is reflective of their general concern expressed in other international fo-
rums for reordering the economic order with respect to access to and control
over natural resources, particularly with respect to their price and rate of
development.
Id.
135. In contrast to the positions of Mr. Gayan, note 131 supra, and Mr. Njenga, supra
note 132, consider the position of Mr. Learson (United States), 5 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8/WP.9/Add.1 (1976):
A comprehensive system for third-party settlement of disputes was an indis-
pensable part of the future convention .... While the dispute settlement
system should extend to all parts of the convention, it would be necessary to
provide for certain limited exceptions, which should be defined carefully and as
restrictively as possible. His delegation was not prepared to exclude the eco-
nomic zone from the settlement procedures.
See also 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 737 (1970); 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 382, 384 (1972).
136. Draft Convention, supra note 3, annex VII, art. 3(a).
137. Id. annex VII, art. 3(e).
138. See note 31 supra. Provisions for election of the members of the LOST and its
president are contained respectively in Draft Convention, supra note 3, annex VI, articles 3
and 12.
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the President, they also indirectly influence the President's choices re-
garding arbitral tribunals. Again, developed States are in jeopardy under
the current scheme."
1 3'
A final example of the Group of 77 reluctance to accept third party
dispute settlement may be found in the escape provisions which are avail-
able to avoid even compuslory settlement by arbitration, along with spe-
cific exceptions from review of certain exercises of national sovereignty. 14 0
The result therefore is to maximize national control over the outcome of
disputes involving some form of qualified sovereignty.
C. Nonsovereignty of the area
The Group of 77 has consistently insisted that the area remain not
subject to any form of national sovereignty.14 Nonsovereignty is essential
to Group of 77 control of the area due to the inadequate technological
position of the Group of 77 nations to exercise sovereign rights. In con-
trast to the EEZ and continental shelf, where the technology to exploit
the resources located therein is either already possessed by Group of 77
nations or is comparatively easy to obtain, technology necessary to exploit
the resources of the area is enormously expensive and presently still in
the developmental stage. 43 Further, many Group of 77 nations derive a
substantial portion of their gross national product from the export of
minerals." 3 Therefore, any regime allowing national sovereignty over the
area would have the following detrimental effects on Group of 77 nations:
(1) A potential for reduction of the GNP of certain mineral exporting
Group of 77 nations if technologically advanced nations were allowed
to mine the deep seabed as a sovereign right.
(2) Even if Group of 77 nations were given sovereign rights over cer-
tain portions of the area, they would not be able to directly exploit
them due to their inferior technological position, and would again be
in a position of foreign exploitation of their national resources.
(3) It would probably be beyond the technological capabilities of most
Group of 77 nations even to detect intrusion into any part of the area
over which they were given sovereign rights, or to defend these sover-
139. Bernhardt, supra note 31, at 76.
140. Draft Convention, supra note 3, at art. 296.
141. Letter dated April 24, 1979 from the Chairman of the Group of 77 to the President
of the Conference, 11 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 80, 81-82, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/77 (1979):
The principle that the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction and the resources of the area are the heritage
of mankind, and the complementary principles according to which the area is
incapable of being appropriated, the need for an international regime including
international machinery which would guarantee the activities carried on in the
area for the benefit of all mankind and not only for that of some States, its
peaceful use and other principles contained in the Declaration - all these
form a normative unity that is indivisible and applicable to the area.
142. See generally Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of
the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
143. See Juda, supra note 130, at 239-43.
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eign rights if infringed upon.
Therefore, Group of 77 control over the area is conceived in political
terms rather than sovereign rights.
Here, the integrity of national sovereignty is not in question; rather
there is a fear of abuse or misuses of power which may result if a smaller
judicial body were to control the authority through judicial review.
14'
Limited judicial review of the actions of the Authority, therefore, is con-
sistent with maximization of Group of 77 control over the Authority, and
consequently, the area.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention are inade-
quate. Significant areas of ocean space are given over to national sover-
eignty, without meaningful compulsory third party review of national ac-
tions. An even greater area of the ocean floor is placed under the
exclusive control of a politically charged body whose members may well
be concerned more with their own national interests than with the faith-
ful administration of the vast resources of the area as the common heri-
tage of mankind. The Draft Convention is the result of the peculiarites of
the democratic process wherein the members acting in their own self-in-
terests purport to reach an agreement which is to the benefit of all.
It is important, however, to recognize the arguments against a strong
compulsory dispute settlement system in criticizing the dispute settle-
ment provisions of the Draft Convention. There appear to be two major
problems-the creeping jurisdiction problem and the self-destruct prob-
lem.
A. The Creeping Jurisdiction Problem
There is a substantial likelihood that a significant number of the
Group of 77 nations would not ratify the Draft Convention if it contained
a strong third party compulsory dispute settlement system. The alterna-
tive of including a strong compulsory dispute settlement as an optional
protocol is contrary to the concept of the "package deal," and would also
be unacceptable to a large number of the Group of 77 nations,14 ' There-
fore, the issue becomes whether the other benefits to be derived from the
Draft Convention outweigh the detriments of a weak dispute settlement
system.
144. See Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 (1980). See also Statement by Mr. Ranjeva
(Madagascar), 5 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 33, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8/WP.9/Add.1 (1976).
145. See Letter dated March 23, 1979 from the Chairman of the group of African States
to the President of the Conference, 11 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 77, 78, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/72
(1979):
The African States reaffirm their determination not to accept any convention
on the Law of the Sea, unless the package of all issues, without exception, have
been satisfactorily resolved in a comprehensive treaty. They will not recognize
any piecemeal agreements and consider that no customary law would be estab-
lished by the provisions of these agreements.
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Perhaps the most significant benefit of the treaty is the establish-
ment of firm limits on the amount of ocean space which is subject to
national sovereignty. A gradual but relentless expansion of national
claims to, or "creeping jurisdiction" over the ocean space has taken place
in recent years. " ' As world population grows, so does the demand on the
finite resources of the planet. Without a stable regime of the sea, the
probability of continuously expanding national jurisdiction by unilateral
action is tremendous. Perhaps the clearly defined limits to national sover-
eignty in the Draft Convention can stop, or at least retard further exten-
sions of national claims to the oceans.
B. The Self-Destruct Problem
Another argument against a strong compulsory dispute settlement
provision in the Draft Convention is that in certain situations nations
clearly would disregard an adjudication if it were sufficiently contrary to
their national interests. In this regard, the escape provisions of article 298
are of great significance. Disobedience of a series of judgments could liter-
ally cause the Draft Convention to self destruct, and its efficacy to be
diminished with every judgment that is ignored. Therefore, strong com-
pulsory dispute settlement could prove a greater detriment than aid to
the international community.
VII. RECOMMENDATION
The recent decision of the Reagan Administration to prevent conclu-
sion of the UNCLOS negotiations has prompted both concern and oppo-
sition in the international community.1 4 7 The dangers in delay include po-
tentially diminished chances of ratification by the already skeptical
Senate, " as well as the possible destruction of the delicate web of com-
promise which holds the Draft Convention together. However, the Draft
Convention in its present form is essentially devoid of any procedure for
modification.1 4 9 Without the ability to adapt to the inevitable political
and technological changes of the future, what today is a viable package of
compromise may tomorrow become a lifeless document which decreases
in significance with every change of conditions.150
There are basically two ways in which the Draft Convention might be
146. See Friedman & Williams, supra note 124, at 561. See also Morin, Jurisdiction
Beyond 200 Miles: A Persistent Problem, 10 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 514 (1980); Martens,
Evolution of Coastal State Jurisdiction: A Conflict Between Developed and Developing
Nations, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 531 (1976).
147. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1981, at 6, col. 1; id., Mar. 8, 1981, at 4, col. 1.
148. See id., Mar. 9, 1981, at 18, col. 1; 66 A.B.A.J. 1192 (1980).
149. Although the Draft Convention, note 3 supra, provides in articles 154 and 155 for
periodic review and for a review conference, this is only with respect to portions dealing
with the area, not the Draft Convention in its entirety.
150. See Oxman, supra note 144, at 18-19: "Article 295 repeats the traditional rule in
the Statute of the International Court of Justice that a decision has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect to that particular dispute." Therefore, the Draft Conven-
tion could not be altered through judicial construction as that any adjudication would not
set a binding precedent for future disputes of that nature.
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altered so as to avoid this pitfall. The first alternative is to provide for
change through judicial construction and interpretation. This would,
however, necessitate a strong system of compulsory third party dispute
settlement which, at present, is foreclosed by political circumstances.
Also, reliance on judicial construction as a primary vehicle of change
would appear to be contrary to generally accepted principles of customary
international law.
The second and better alternative is to provide for an amendment
procedure. In this way, the Draft Convention could be given the adapta-
bility needed to remain effective over the long run, without risking de-
struction of the present agreement.
Ideally, a permanent convention should be established which could
meet at regular intervals to review and amend the text. Amendment
should only be possible with a large number of affirmative votes of the'
member states, and should be self-executing. This procedure would sat-
isfy the Group of 77, as their control would remain substantial, and
within a political rather than a judicial forum. A high vote threshold
would also satisfy the developed nations because the Group of 77 could
not amend the Draft Convention without the approval of the developed
nations. However, to avoid allowing a single nation the power to block
amendment, a unanimous affirmative vote should not be required.
The most positive feature of an amendment procedure would be to
keep lines of communication and negotiation open at the multilateral
level. The present Draft Convention substantially places the burden of
finding an acceptable means of dispute settlement on the parties. While
the recommended amendment procedure would not change this, it should
facilitate communications between disputing parties, and therefore be an
aid to dispute settlement, if not a means of resolution of issues which are
otherwise excluded from any other form of settlement.
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